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We analyse the implications of intra-ﬁrm bargaining for business cycle dynamics in
models with large ﬁrms and search frictions. Intra-ﬁrm bargaining implies a feedback
eect from the marginal revenue product to wage setting which leads ﬁrms to over-hire
in order to reduce workers’ bargaining position within the ﬁrm. The key to this eect
are decreasing returns and/or downward-sloping demand. We show that equilibrium
wages and employment are higher in steady state compared to a bargaining framework
in which ﬁrms neglect this feedback. However, the eects of intra-ﬁrm bargaining on
adjustment dynamics, volatility and comovement are negligible.
Keywords:
Strategic wage setting, search and matching frictions, business cycle propagation
JEL-Classiﬁcation:
E24, E32, J64Non-technical summary
In models that analyse the role of the labor market for business cycle dynamics it
is typically assumed that the marginal (revenue) product of labor is independent of
employment. In many cases, this is not very plausible, which has been noted in
the literature. The marginal product of a ﬁrm falls with its production for example
because of a downward-sloping demand curve or a concave production function. In
that case, there are two consequences for wage setting: on the one hand, a ﬁrm
has the incentive to expand production so as to reduce the wage per worker, which
depends on the marginal product. This is a partial equilibrium eect. However, in
general equilibrium, the higher demand for labor will improve the bargaining position
of worker and thus lead to higher wages. This suggest that a theoretical bargaining
solution should take account of employers’ strategic considerations.
We analyse the issue of intra-ﬁrm bargaining in a calibrated general equilibrium
business cycle model. Indeed we ﬁnd that there are strong eects on the steady state
of the model, with lower unemployment and higher wages than in the model with-
out strategic wage setting. However, it turns out that the dynamic, business cycle,
eects are qualitatively and quantitatively weak. In response to a positive aggregate
shock, unemployment falls slightly more, employment and vacancies increase some-
what more, and wages fall a little less. In this respect, intra-ﬁrm bargaining matters,
as the bargaining position of workers improves by less than is mandated by the rise in
labor market tightness. But overall, the transmission of aggregate shocks on output
is virtually unaected.
The ﬁndings can be interpreted as implying that, in many circumstances, re-
searchers may safely ignore intra-ﬁrm bargaining even when analyzing business cycle
models with large ﬁrms that face decreasing marginal product. If we - falsely - cal-
ibrate a model without this strategic feedback on wages to actual data where it is
present, the mistake we make is likely to be small. This is not meant to imply that
there may not be important and interesting eects on the steady state of a model,
which indeed have been analysed in the literature.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
In Modellen, in denen die Rolle des Arbeitsmarktes für die konjunkturelle Entwick-
lung einer Volkswirtschaft untersucht wird, wird in der Regel unterstellt, dass der
Grenzertrag der Arbeit unabhängig von der Firmengröße ist. In vielen Fällen ist dies
aber wenig plausibel. Wenn der Grenzertrag eines Unternehmens mit seiner Pro-
duktion abnimmt - etwa als Resultat einer konkaven Produktionsfunktion oder einer
fallenden Nachfrage nach dem Output des Unternehmens - hat das zweierlei Konse-
quenzen für den Lohnbildungsprozess: Zum einen hat das Unternehmen im Partial-
gleichgewicht einen Anreiz, seine Produktion auszudehnen und so den Lohn seiner
Arbeitnehmer (der dem Grenzprodukt entspricht ) zu senken und damit den eigenen
Gewinn zu erhöhen. Auf der anderen Seite führt - im allgemeinen Gleichgewicht - die
stärkere gesamtwirtschaftliche Arbeitsnachfrage zu besseren Verhandlungspositionen
der Arbeitnehmer und höheren Löhnen. Beide Argumente legen für die theoretische
Lohnﬁndung eine Verhandlungslösung nahe, die die strategischen Überlegungen der
Arbeitgeber berücksichtigt.
Wir analysieren diese Zusammenhänge in einem kalibrierten allgemeinen Gleich-
gewichtsmodell. Tatsächliche zeigen sich starke Eekte im steady state des Modells,
indem Arbeitslosigkeit niedriger und Löhne höher sind, als in dem Modell ohne strate-
gische Lohnsetzung auf Unternehmensseite. Allerdings zeigt sich auch, dass die kon-
junkturellen Unterschiede qualitativ und quantitativ gering sind: die Arbeitslosigkeit
sinkt etwas stärker, die Beschäftigung und die oenen Stellen nehmen etwas mehr zu,
und die Löhne steigen etwas schwächer als Folge eines positiven Schocks. Insgesamt
ist die Transmission von konjunkturellen Schocks unverändert.
Die Ergebnisse lassen sich dahingehend interpretieren, dass Ökonomen in vielen
Fällen die strategische Rolle von fallendem Grenzprodukt oder -ertrag vernachlässigen
können, wenn sie die konjunkturelle Entwicklung der Wirtschaft untersuchen. Dies ist
insofern von Bedeutung, da zum einen viele Forschungsarbeiten diese Eekte ignori-
eren, und zum anderen Modelle ohne strategische Lohnsetzung wesentlich einfacher
zu lösen sind. Dies soll jedoch nicht suggerieren, dass sich daraus nicht interessante
Implikationen für den steady state ergeben können. In der Tat gibt es in der Literatur
Hinweise auf solche Eekte.Contents
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1 Introduction
We analyze the aggregate implications of intra-ﬁrm bargaining in a fully-ﬂedged, yet
simple, general equilibrium business cycle model with search frictions in the labor
market. The issue of intra-ﬁrm wage bargaining arises whenever the scale of the
ﬁrm changes non-linearly with its labor input. The two most prominent examples
are concave production and downward-sloping demand. The ﬁrst example has been
studied by Smith (1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer
(2004) and Rotemberg (2006). The second example has been analyzed by Ebell and
Haefke (2004) and also Rotemberg (2006).
We show how intra-ﬁrm bargaining implies a feedback eect in the bargaining
process from a ﬁrm’s marginal product to wage setting. Firms have an incentive to
increase production in order to decrease the marginal product, and thus the wages
of existing employees, in order to capture higher rents. In eect, ﬁrms reduce the
bargaining position of the marginal worker by over-hiring. This partial equilibrium
scenario, however, implies a general equilibrium feedback ee c ti nt h a ti tl e a d st oa n
expansion in production, and thus higher surplus to be shared among more workers.
With a tighter labor market, the additional hiring of ﬁrms improves the outside
options of workers, and thus raises their wage in general equilibrium.
The main contribution of this paper lies in the analysis of business cycle dynamics.
When compared to a speciﬁcation that neglects intra-ﬁrm bargaining, the dynamic
response of the economy to a productivity shock is barely aected. The response
of unemployment is slightly magniﬁed, depending on the degree of returns to scale
and elasticity of demand. Similarly, employment and vacancies rise slightly more. In
this respect, intra-ﬁrm bargaining plays a role as the bargaining position of workers
improves by less than is mandated by the rise in labor market tightness. However,
1Authors’ a!liation: Michael Krause, Deutsche Bundesbank, Economic Research Center,
Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14, D-60431 Frankfurt, Germany. Tel.: +49(0)69 9566-2382. Fax: +49(0)69
9566-3082. Email: michael.u.krause@bundesbank.de.
Thomas Lubik, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economics Department, 701 East Byrd Street,
Richmond, VA 23261. Tel.: +1 804 697-8246. Email: thomas.lubik@rich.frb.org
The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond, the Federal Reserve System or the Deutsche Bundesbank.
1intra-ﬁrm bargaining does not aect the qualitative response of the economy and an
overall eect on output is virtually non-existent.
We interpret our ﬁndings to the eect that, in many circumstances, researchers
may safely ignore intra-ﬁrm bargaining even when analyzing business cycle models
with large ﬁrms that face decreasing returns or downward-sloping demand. This is
not meant to imply that there may not be important and interesting eects on the
steady state of a model. This has been explored, for example, by Ebell and Haefke
(2004). However, if we — falsely — calibrate a model without this strategic feedback
on wages to actual data where it is present, the mistake we make is likely to be small.
Intra-ﬁrm bargaining is not the driving force of signiﬁcant cyclical dynamics.
The gist of this argument can be illustrated by means of the following static exam-
ple that abstracts from search and matching frictions. Consider a simple bargaining
problem of a large ﬁrm that deals with each worker individually. Employed work-
ers bargain over the wage z, with their outside option being unemployment which
generates beneﬁts e. The ﬁrm’s bargaining position is given by the surplus that an
additional worker generates, net of its outside option which is the value of leaving the
job unﬁlled. This outside option is zero.
Let the ﬁrm’s price be s and its output |.T h eﬁ r mp a y sw a g ez and employs q
workers. Its value is given by its revenue minus cost, which consists of the wage bill
and the hiring cost:
Y = s|  zq=




















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side would not be present if the ﬁrm were a price
taker in the product market; the ﬁrst term in square brackets would be absent if the
ﬁrm were a price taker in the labor market. The latter would equal zero when ﬁrms
can only hire one worker, or when the ﬁrm does not internalize the feedback from its
employment choice to the wage schedule. The value of a marginal worker is therefore
the dierence between marginal revenue and marginal cost, pu(q)pf(q),w h i c hw e
i n d i c a t ea sd e p e n d i n go nt h el e v e lo fe m p l o y m e n t .
2For simplicity of exposition we abstract from ﬁxed costs of hiring and intertemporal considera-
tions.
2The Nash bargaining solution maximizes the weighted product of the involved
parties’ surpluses. Given a worker’s bargaining weight , the solution is:














The wage is a weighted average of the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue and the worker’s outside
option. The second term in brackets captures the eect from intra-ﬁrm bargaining.
Marginal revenue is adjusted for the feedback of the employment choice on the wage,
w h i c hi nt u r na ects the optimal number of employees. Stole and Zwiebel (1996)
have shown that this prompts the ﬁrm to over-hire. This feedback eect crucially
relies on the assumption that the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue function is not independent
of employment. Otherwise, as in the basic one-worker one-ﬁrm set-up of Pissarides
(2000), the wage would not depend on q as pu(q)=s,f o ra l lq=
In the rest of the paper we proceed as follows. The next section outlines the
model under the assumption of decreasing returns to labor and matching frictions
in the labor market. This allows us to disentangle the relevant eect without excess
complexity. We then add general equilibrium constraints, calibrate the model, and
proceed to analyze the steady state and business cycle implications graphically and
numerically. In section 4, we discuss the similarities of the results to the case of
monopolistic competition, and show the robustness of our ﬁndings to its inclusion
alongside decreasing returns. The ﬁnal section concludes and highlights some further
connections to the literature.
2 A Business Cycle Model with Search Frictions
and Intra-Firm Bargaining
We illustrate the eects of (neglecting) intra-ﬁrm bargaining (IFB) by means of a
simple model in which production is characterized by decreasing returns to labor and
ﬁrms are large in the sense that they employ multiple workers. This contrasts with
the standard search and matching framework in which production originates in one-
worker one-ﬁrm pairs. We assume an economy with a continuum of ﬁrms that use





where 0 ? 1,a n dDw is a stochastic productivity process common to all ﬁrms.
qw is the measure of workers employed by the ﬁrm. We assume that all ﬁrms behave
symmetrically, and consequently suppress ﬁrm-speciﬁc indices. With the total labor
force normalized to one, aggregate employment is identical to ﬁrm-level employment.
Unemployment is deﬁned as:
xw =1 qw= (2)
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions encapsulated




w . It describes the outcome of search
behavior of ﬁrms and workers in that unemployed job seekers xw are matched with
vacancies yw at rate p(xw>y w) to produce new employment relationships. 0 ??
1 is the match elasticity of the unemployed, and pA0 describes the e!ciency
of the match process. Using the deﬁnition of labor market tightness w = yw@xw,
the aggregate probability of ﬁlling a vacancy (taken parametrically by the ﬁrms) is
t(w)=p(yw>x w)@yw. The evolution of employment is then:
qw+1 =( 1 )[qw + ywt(w)]= (3)
0 ??1 is the (constant) separation rate that measures inﬂows into unemployment.
Firms maximize proﬁts by choosing employment next period and vacancies to be
posted, subject to the ﬁrm-level employment constraint. This job creation comes at
a ﬂow cost fA0. The Bellman equation is:




w  z(qw)qw  fyw + HwwV(qw+1)}= (4)
V(·) is the value of the ﬁrm, w is the time-varying discount factor, and z(qw) is the
wage schedule, which will be determined below. The notation indicates that the wage
of the marginal worker potentially depends on the existing number of workers in the
ﬁrm. The ﬁrst-order conditions are:




4where w is the Lagrange-multiplier on the employment constraint (3). The corre-












The presence of the derivative of the wage schedule reﬂects the impact of intra-
ﬁrm wage bargaining. When choosing employment, ﬁrms take into account how an
additional worker aects their bargaining position and thus wage setting.
We deﬁne the value of the marginal job M(qw)=V0(qw), and rewrite the envelope
condition as an asset equation:
M(qw)=Dwq
31
w  z(qw) 
Cz(qw)
Cqw
qw +( 1 )HwwM(qw+1)= (6)
With constant returns to scale,  =1 , the marginal product of labor is Dw (the ‘one-
worker one-ﬁrm’ case), and the wage is independent of the ﬁrm’s current employment
level. The asset equation then reduces to the one in Pissarides (2000).




=( 1 )HwwM(qw+1)> (7)















To gain some intuition, suppose ﬁrms anticipate an increase in productivity Dw+1.
This raises the present value of proﬁts and thereby the marginal beneﬁt of hiring
more workers at given marginal cost f@t(w). Other things being equal, more vacancies
are posted, and qw+1 is expected to be higher, which, in turn, reduces the expected
marginal product of labor until equality is restored.
This adjustment is aected by two additional channels. The ﬁrst takes place
within the ﬁrm, hence the label intra-ﬁrm bargaining. Adding a worker reduces
the eective bargaining power of existing workers, and thus their wage. Assuming
HwCz(qw+1)@Cqw+1 ? 0, which we will show below to be true, this ampliﬁes the in-
centive to post vacancies and employment increases further. In order to determine
the quantitative signiﬁcance of this eect, we need to solve for the equilibrium wage
schedule z(qw)> which is done below. The other channel is a feedback eect which
5arises in general equilibrium. As all ﬁrms post more vacancies, aggregate vacancies
increase, the labor market tightens, and it becomes more costly to recruit additional
workers with the rise in f@t(w). Therefore, employment in each ﬁrm increases by less
than it would if w where constant.
2.1 Determining the Wage Schedule
Wages are determined based on the Nash bargaining solution: surpluses accruing to
the matched parties are split according to a rule that maximizes the weighted average
of the respective surpluses. Denoting the workers’ weight in the bargaining process
as  5 [0>1], this implies the sharing rule:




where Zw is the asset value of employment, Xw is the value of being unemployed, and
Mw is, as before, the value of the marginal worker to the ﬁrm.3
The value of employment to a worker is described by the following Bellman equa-
tion:
Zw = zw + Hww[(1  )Zw+1 + Xw+1]= (10)
Workers receive the wage zw, and transition into unemployment next period with
probability . The value of searching for a job, when currently unemployed, is:
Xw = e + Hww[iw(1  )Zw+1 +( 1 iw(1  ))Xw+1]= (11)
An unemployed searcher receives beneﬁts e and transitions into employment with
probability iw(1). The job ﬁnding rate iw is deﬁned as i(w)=p(yw>x w)@xw which
is decreasing in tightness w. It is adjusted for the probability that a completed match
gets dissolved before production begins next period.
We substitute the asset equations into the sharing rule (9) and, after some algebra,










+( 1 )e= (12)
3In models with one-worker ﬁrms, the net surplus of a ﬁrm is given by Mw Yw> with Yw the value
of a vacant job. By free entry, Yw is then assumed to be driven to zero.
6Because of the presence of the derivative of the wage schedule on account of intra-ﬁrm
bargaining this a ﬁrst-order dierential equation, the solution of which is:
z(qw)=

1  (1  )
Dwq
31
w + fw +( 1 )e= (13)





1  (1  )
Dwq
32
w ? 0> (14)
which, when inserted into (12), veriﬁes the consistency with the solution.
For given employment, intra-ﬁrm bargaining increases the wage by virtue of the
scale factor 1@[1  (1  )] A 1. The addition of a worker to the workforce implies
a higher value to the ﬁrm as it lowers the marginal product of all incumbent workers.
A new worker has therefore a higher value to the ﬁrm than just his marginal product
because he contributes to lowering the ﬁrm’s wage bill. By the logic of bargaining, the
surplus is split, and workers get their share in terms of a higher wage. However, for
the very reason that adding workers reduces the wage bill, ﬁrms post more vacancies
to increase employment. This lowers the marginal impact of adding workers, which
is declining in qw. Thus, workers’ marginal product decreases with employment and
hence the wage. Equation (13) gives the overall eect of the falling marginal product
on the wage, corrected for intra-ﬁrm bargaining.4






1  (1  )
Dw+1q
31





Intra-ﬁrm bargaining leads to the term 1@[1  (1  )] which reﬂects the ﬁrm’s
internalization of the ee c to fe m p l o y m e n to nt h ew a g e .I te x e r t sal e v e le ect in that
the marginal beneﬁt from adding workers is perceived to be higher. This induces
more job creation. For the case of constant returns,  =1 , the equation collapses to
the usual form, and intra-ﬁrm bargaining is irrelevant. However, our argument has so
far relied on partial equilibrium reasoning from the perspective of the ﬁrm. We will
analyze below the general equilibrium feedbacks both on the steady state allocation
and on the model’s adjustment dynamics.
4In a sense, this setup can be interpreted from the perspective of insider-outsider theory: ﬁrms
are willing to expand employment and incur vacancy costs in order to reduce the bargaining power
of insiders. The crucial assumption is that the incumbents’ wages are not protected by long-term
contracts, but are constantly renegotiated. The term ‘bargaining power’ is, of course, used loosely
in the sense that the Nash bargaining parameter  is ﬁxed.
72.2 Wage Determination without Intra-Firm Bargaining
We assume from the outset that ﬁrms internalize the dependence of the wage schedule
on employment (see Eqs. (4) and (5)). This allows them to act strategically and
extract rents from the workers. As an alternative assume that ﬁrms behave myopically
by taking the wage of its incumbent workforce as given when choosing employment.
This amounts to Czw@Cqw =0in the ﬁrms’ problem. In this case, the value function
of the ﬁrm is:
M(qw)=Dwq
31
w  zw +( 1 )HwwM(qw+1)= (16)
Following the same steps as outlined above, we ﬁnd the corresponding wage equation:
zw = Dwq
31
w + fw +( 1 )e> (17)












When comparing the two job creation conditions, the only algebraic dierence is the
term multiplying the marginal product of labor, namely (1) ? (1)@[1(1)].
Intra-ﬁrm bargaining scales the marginal product of labor and thereby introduces
an additional incentive for vacancy posting. The wage equations and job creation
conditions under both scenarios will be the reference points from which we evaluate
the general equilibrium eects of intra-ﬁrm bargaining.
2.3 Closing the Model
We assume that all workers belong to a representative household that insures its
members perfectly against income risk implied by the two states of employment and
unemployment. By means of a complete internal asset market, incomes are pooled in
such a way that all households have the same level of income.5 Assuming a CRRA-










5This assumption is standard in the literature following Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996). Note
that the unemployed enjoy a higher level of utility than the working since they do not suer the
disutility of employment.
8which ﬁrms use to evaluate future revenue streams. 0 ??1 is the household’s
discount factor, and A0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. fw is the
household’s consumption, which draws from production as described by the social
resource constraint:
fw = |w  fyw= (20)
Total hiring costs fyw are subtracted form gross production as resources are lost in
the search process.
3 The General Equilibrium Eects of Intra-Firm
Bargaining
This simple search and matching model with concave production provides a labora-
tory for analyzing the qualitative and quantitative eects of intra-ﬁrm bargaining.
We proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst compute the model’s steady state and compare
allocations across the two wage-setting assumptions. This discussion parallels the
results in Cahuc and Wasmer (2001). In the second step, we study the dynamic
behavior of the model and the implications for business cycle statistics.
In order to ﬁx a baseline for the model’s quantitative analysis, we calibrate the
parameters to typical values found in the literature.6 We set the discount factor
 =0 =98,a n dc h o o s e =1 . The mean of the technology process Dw is normalized
to unity. We assume that the input elasticity  =2 @3, roughly the labor share in
U.S. income. The separation rate is ﬁxed at a value of  =0 =1, which is a mid-point
of the range of values used in the literature. The match elasticity  is calibrated at
0=4 based on the empirical estimates in Blanchard and Diamond (1989), while the
match e!ciency parameter p =0 =4 is chosen to generate an unemployment rate
of roughly 8-10%. To be consistent with this, we ﬁx unemployment beneﬁts e and
vacancy creation costs f at 0=1. Finally, the Nash bargaining parameter  =0 =5,i n
absence of any supporting empirical evidence.7
6A more detailed discussion of the calibration of a closely related model can be found in Krause
and Lubik (2006).
7Note that this violates the e!ciency condition in Hosios (1990). We do not regard this as
restrictive for our purposes since, as Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) have shown, the e!ciency condition
is modiﬁed under intra-ﬁrm wage bargaining, and second we are not explicitly concerned with welfare
considerations.
93.1 Steady State Eects
The model’s ﬁrst-order conditions can be reduced to a two-equation system in unem-
ployment x and vacancies y (see Pissarides, 2000). The ﬁrst equation is the Beveridge
curve, and is derived from the employment accumulation equation (3) in steady state,
after substituting the expression for the ﬁrm-matching rate t() and unemployment








It is straightforward to show that this relationship is downward-sloping and concave
in y-x space.
The second steady-state relationship is derived from the job creation condition
(15). Substitution and rearrangement results in the following expression:














 (1  )e> (22)
for which no analytical solution in terms of y is available. Instead, we solve this equa-
tion numerically for our baseline calibration. It can be shown analytically, though,
that the job creation curve is upward-sloping and mildly convex. Consequently, the
two curves intersect once, so that the model delivers a unique steady state equilib-
rium. The two curves determining the steady state are depicted in Figure 1. The
ﬁgure also contains the job creation curve that neglects the feedback from intra-ﬁrm
bargaining (IFB), which is derived from (18).
Steady state equilibrium is at the intersection of both curves which yields an un-
employment rate of 8=5%. Without IFB, the job creation schedule is ﬂatter and tilts
downwards, resulting in steady state unemployment of 10%. This conﬁrms the result
by Stole and Zwiebel (1996), subsequently reﬁned by Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) and
Ebell and Haefke (2004), that intra-ﬁrm bargaining leads to over-hiring. Firms have
a ni n c e n t i v et oa d dm o r ee m p l o y e e ss i n c et h ew a g ep a i dt oa l lw o r k e r si sf a l l i n gi ne m -
ployment. This eect is mitigated by the feedback that hiring has on unemployment,
as it raises labor market tightness and thus marginal hiring costs f@t().O v e r a l l ,t h e
level of vacancies and employment are higher in the IFB-case since ﬁrms can generate
higher surplus by diluting the eective bargaining power of their workers.8
8The underlying mechanism is not a labor supply eect in the traditional sense, which would
10The same reasoning can be illustrated with an alternative description of the steady
state. We use the Beveridge curve to substitute out q in the wage equation (13), from
which we derive a relationship between z and , labeled the ‘wage curve’. The job
creation condition can be rewritten in a similar way. Both schedules are depicted
in Figure 2. We also plot the two schedules for the speciﬁcation in which intra-ﬁrm
bargaining is neglected. The ﬁgure shows that both wage and tightness are lower
compared to the baseline with IFB.9 Recall that, for given labor market tightness ,
higher employment allows a ﬁrm to reduce wages paid to workers, and to increase
overall proﬁts. However, when all ﬁrms act in this manner, labor market tightness
rises both due to more vacancy postings and to a decline in unemployment. The
overall eect on the wage is positive, so that intra-ﬁrm bargaining raises wages in
general equilibrium, which Figure 2 illustrates.
3.2 Adjustment Dynamics and Business Cycle Statistics
We now turn to an analysis of the eects of intra-ﬁrm bargaining on the dynamic prop-
erties of the model. In order to do so, we linearize both the baseline speciﬁcation and
the model that neglects IFB around their respective steady states. Strictly speaking,
this analysis conﬂates two eects: the dierences in steady state, and the dierences
in the coe!cients in the dynamic model. It is quite conceivable that models with
identical steady states can have dierent dynamic properties. Similarly, dierences in
responses (which are themselves measured in percentage deviations from the steady
state) have to be interpreted with care as they are relative to dierent steady states.
This implied error in our framework is likely to be small since the dierences in steady
states are small.10
The resulting linear rational expectations models are solved using standard tech-
require increases in the wage in order to attract additional workers. More searchers ﬁnd employment
since the increase in vacancy postings reduces labor market tightness, and thus increases the job-
ﬁnding rate, which is enough to compensate the marginal unemployed worker for the lower wage
rate.
9Since both schedules are aected under the dierent speciﬁcations, it may be conceivable that,
say, the wage increased or decreased. Analytically, the schedules with and without IFB dier by
af a c t o ro f1@[1  (1  )] that multiplies the marginal product of labor Dq1. The schedules
thus shift both in the same direction. Only for very small values of  such a reversal can occur.
10The conceptual background we have in mind is that a researcher might ask how much of an error
he commits when neglecting intra-ﬁrm bargaining. The reason for this neglect might be di!culty in
solving dierential equations of the type (12), and the possibly burdensome underlying ﬁrst-order
conditions. Alternatively, a researcher may be interested in exploring the implications of myopic
behavior by ﬁrms that ignores the strategic incentives to expand employment.
11niques. We ﬁrst compare dynamic adjustment paths towards the steady state after
a productivity disturbance. Secondly, we contrast their predictions for business cycle
statistics based on simulated data. In order to describe the stochastic properties of
the model we have to calibrate the technology process. We assume that productivity
Dw follows an AR(1) process with autoregressive coe!cient D =0 =90,a n dd r i v e nb y
az e r om e a ni n n o v a t i o n%w with variance 2
% =0 =0072. This value is chosen to replicate
the observed U.S. GDP standard deviation of 1=62%.
The impulse response function for both speciﬁcations are depicted in Figure 3.
Two observations stand out immediately. First, the model exhibits an almost com-
plete lack of internal propagation. The behavior of GDP follows virtually in its
entirety the adjustment path of the productivity process. This observation has been
emphasized by Krause and Lubik (2006), and is a corollary to the Shimer (2005)
argument that the standard search and matching model is unable to replicate the
volatility of unemployment and vacancies. Second, and more importantly for our dis-
cussion, the responses are remarkably similar in terms of shape, size, and direction. A
persistent 1% increase in productivity raises current production and future marginal
products of labor. This raises the value of jobs, and thus vacancies posted, per the job
creation condition (15). This leads to increased employment in the following period
(see equation (3)). Workers experience a rise in wages on account of higher productiv-
ity and labor market tightness. However, wages rise by less than productivity because
of the strategic hiring decisions by ﬁrms. Thus, intra-ﬁrm bargaining does not change
the basic dynamics of search and matching, but it (slightly) modiﬁes its strength.
We also compare business cycles statistics computed from simulations of the two
model speciﬁcations. The results are reported in Table 1. The baseline model is cali-
brated so as to replicate the standard deviation of U.S. GDP; the standard deviations
of all other variables are then measured relative to this value. The overall impression
is that the cyclical properties of the model with and without intra-ﬁrm bargaining
are virtually identical. There is no dierence in the behavior of output - which has
already been apparent from the impulse response functions, and the real wage. How-
ever, when intra-ﬁrm bargaining is neglected, unemployment, vacancies and tightness
are roughly 10% less volatile than in the baseline case. When compared to the corre-
sponding business cycle facts for the U.S. economy, both models fall woefully short:
the latter statistics are o by a factor of 10, the wage is 50% more volatile than in
the data.
12In terms of contemporaneous correlations, both speciﬁcations produce identical
results. The models are reasonably successful in matching unemployment correlations.
A benchmark statistic is the correlation between unemployment and vacancies. The
model-implied value of 0=58 is not too far away from the value in U.S. data of 0=95.
However, the models produce perfect correlation between the wage, , and output,
which is inconsistent with the data. Overall, these result support the impression
that a model with intra-ﬁrm bargaining is essentially observationally equivalent to
one without. An empirical, likelihood-based test of both speciﬁcations would ﬁnd
it very di!cult to distinguish between the two alternatives as they exhibit identical
comovement and only minor dierences between variable-speciﬁc volatilities. While
intra-ﬁrm bargaining is a conceptually compelling idea, and quite conceivably relevant
at the ﬁrm level, we conclude that it does not have a signiﬁcant eect on aggregate
dynamics.
4 Monopolistic Competition and Intra-Firm Bar-
gaining
An alternative source of a declining marginal revenue product is downward-sloping
demand in an environment with monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. Even with linear
production, ﬁrms would be compelled, and are able to expand hiring since they can
capture rents by moving down the demand curve. This assumption has been used,
for instance, in New Keynesian models of output and inﬂation dynamics with search
and matching in the labor market. Key examples are Trigari (2004) and Krause and
Lubik (2006).
We assume that output of a representative monopolistically competitive ﬁrm is
linear in labor: |w = Dwqw, and that each ﬁrm faces a downward-sloping demand
function for the product variety it produces: |w =( sw@sw)
3 \w,w h e r e\w is aggregate
demand, and sw, the aggregate price level, both taken as given by the ﬁrm; A1 is
the substitution elasticity between competing varieties, and sw is the individual ﬁrm’s















The asset equation for the value of a marginal job can be derived following the same













w  z(qw) 
Cz(qw)
Cqw
qw +( 1 )HwwM(qw+1)= (24)
Note that despite linear production, marginal revenue is responds elastically to changes
in employment, which opens the possibility of intra-ﬁrm bargaining.
The asset equation for workers remain unchanged, and so does the sharing rule.



















+( 1 )e= (25)















w + fw +( 1 )e= (26)
It is straightforward to verify that this expression corresponds to the wage equation
(13), derived under concave production, if  = 31
 . However, this neglects the general
equilibrium feedback eect from aggregate demand condition, captured by \w,w h i c h
both parties in the bargaining process take as given. Substituting \w = |w = Dwqw, i.e.





Dw + fw +( 1 )e= (27)
The aggregate wage equation is now independent of employment (on account of con-
stant returns in production), but the feedback eect from intra-ﬁrm bargaining mod-



















Since the employment equation (3) is unaected in the monopolistic competition
framework, we can describe the steady state solution by reference to Figures 1 and 2.
In the former graph, the shape of the curves is unaected, there is a unique equilib-
rium, and intra-ﬁrm bargaining results in over-hiring, as the job creation curve tilts
downward when IFB is neglected. Similarly, the steady state relationships depicted
14in Figure 2 remain the same qualitatively. In the literature, the substitution elas-
ticity  is often calibrated with a value of 11, which implies a steady state mark-up
of 10%. Given our baseline speciﬁcation with  =0 =5, the IFB feedback coe!cient
is 1@(1  @)  1=05, which is negligible with respect to steady state values and
dynamics.
5 A Final Generalization
Concave production and downward-sloping demand do not produce substantial eects
of intra-ﬁrm bargaining on their own for plausible calibrations. We therefore combine
both elements from before in the simple search and matching framework. Following











w + fw +( 1 )e= (29)



















The speciﬁcation without IFB results in the same equations, the dierence being the
denominator of the term pre-multiplying the marginal product of labor. The scale







.T h i s
factor is increasing in , decreasing in , and decreasing in %. In other words, intra-
ﬁrm bargaining aects steady state allocations and business cycle dynamics more in
economies in which workers enjoy higher bargaining power (large ), the labor share
of income is small (low ), and markets are not very competitive (low %).11
We illustrate the role of IFB in the extended model by a few numerical examples,
which are reported in Table 2. We compute various model statistics for variations
of the parameters aecting the scale factor. In particular, we contrast our baseline
calibration with a high worker bargaining parameter ( =0 =9), a lower labor share
11This reasoning underlies Ebell and Haefke’s (2004) ﬁnding that product market deregulation can
have substantial employment and welfare eects. In fact, their implied values for the substitution
elasticity is % =3 .
15( =0 =5), and inelastic demand (% =2 ). We ﬁrst note that for an extreme parame-
terization, shown in the tight-most column, the scale factor goes up to 3,c o m p a r e d
t oab a s e l i n eo f1=25. That this implies stronger eects of IFB is conﬁrmed by the
percentage increase of steady state employment and wage over the case when IFB is
neglected, as the percentage change is monotonically related to the scale factor. For
baseline bargaining power, the change in employment is, however, fairly small, but
more substantial for wages. With higher worker bargaining power, these numbers
increase dramatically. What the percentages hide, however, are the actual steady
state levels. The second row in the table shows that employment actually falls with
increases in the scale factor.
An increase in the scale factor also has a monotonic eect on the percentage change
in the standard deviation of labor market tightness. For a given parameterization,
the inclusion of intra-ﬁrm bargaining improves the predictive power of the model as
far as the volatility of key labor market variables is concerned. However, this scale
factor eect again masks the fact that with high  and low % the standard deviation
of  is implausibly low. We conclude that the combination of concave production and
downward-sloping demand can increase the strength of the feedback eect of intra-
ﬁrm bargaining. From a pure calibration perspective, there is, however, a trade-o
between ‘maximizing’ the IFB eect and the plausibility of key model predictions.
For empirically relevant parameter values, the IFB eect still remains negligible as
far as business cycle dynamics are concerned.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Intra-ﬁrm bargaining yields a strategic incentive for ﬁrms to expand employment in
order to weaken their workers’ bargaining position. This expands employment and
raises wages in general equilibrium because lower unemployment and higher vacancies
posted raise workers’ outside options, osetting the partial equilibrium eect. While
this is a conceptually compelling story of hiring behavior at a microeconomic level,
we have shown in this paper that the aggregate eects of intra-ﬁrm bargaining are
negligible in standard search and matching framework with concave production and
downward-sloping product demand.
The results in this paper should not be taken to imply that we regard intra-ﬁrm
bargaining as irrelevant per se. The speciﬁcation that combines both sources of de-
16clining marginal revenue product shows that somewhat extreme, but still plausible
calibrations can imply large eects. This raises a few questions for further research.
Given aggregate data, do the restrictions implied by an IFB speciﬁcation help with
parameter speciﬁcation? Speciﬁcally, the bargaining parameter  is di!cult to pin
down. Furthermore, it is often di!cult to ﬁt the behavior of the marginal product
of labor, which might be ameliorated by the inclusion of the scale factor. A related
question is to what extent it is possible to distinguish between the two speciﬁca-
tion in aggregate data. A second line of research delves deeper into the production
side. Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer (2004) have shown that intra-ﬁrm bargaining
has dierent eects in models with capital and heterogenous labor. Depending on
the bargaining power of workers, it may actually lead to underemployment. Their
analysis, however, is restricted to the steady state only.
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0.78 0.95 1.55 0.98 1.62
Neglecting IFB
0.68 0.84 1.36 1.02 1.62
U.S. Data
6.90 8.27 14.96 0.69 1.62
Correlations
uv  wy
u 1 -0.58 -0.85 -0.84 -0.86
v 1 0.91 0.92 0.91
 1 0.99 0.99
w 10 . 9 9
y 1
19Table 2: Intra-Firm Bargaining: Robustness









Scale Factor 1.25 1.50 2.50 3.08
Employment w/ IFB 0.92 0.88 0.73 0.72
%I n c r e a s ed u et oI F B
Employment 3.7 6.0 35.2 41.2
Wage 30.6 48.4 137 167
Std. Deviation of 
Rel. to Output 1.60 1.90 0.55 0.53
% Increase due to IFB 16.8 35.7 52.8 60.6
20Figure 1: The Steady State Eects of Intra-Firm Bargaining



























21Figure 2: Wage Determination in Steady State




















22Figure 3: The Dynamic Eects of Intra-Firm Bargaining













































































































The following Discussion Papers have been published since 2006: 
Series 1: Economic Studies 
 
  1  2006  The dynamic relationship between the Euro 
      overnight rate, the ECB’s policy rate and the  Dieter Nautz 
      term spread  Christian J. Offermanns 
 
  2  2006  Sticky prices in the euro area: a summary of  Álvarez, Dhyne, Hoeberichts 
      new micro evidence  Kwapil, Le Bihan, Lünnemann 
        Martins, Sabbatini, Stahl 
       Vermeulen,  Vilmunen 
 
 3  2006  Going  multinational:  What are the effects  
      on home market performance?  Robert Jäckle 
 
  4  2006  Exports versus FDI in German manufacturing: 
      firm performance and participation in inter-  Jens Matthias Arnold 
      national markets  Katrin Hussinger 
 
  5  2006  A disaggregated framework for the analysis of  Kremer, Braz, Brosens 
      structural developments in public finances  Langenus, Momigliano 
       Spolander   
 
  6  2006  Bond pricing when the short term interest rate  Wolfgang Lemke  
      follows a threshold process  Theofanis Archontakis 
 
  7  2006  Has the impact of key determinants of German 
      exports changed?  
      Results from estimations of Germany’s intra  
      euro-area and extra euro-area exports  Kerstin Stahn 
 
  8  2006  The coordination channel of foreign exchange  Stefan Reitz 
      intervention: a nonlinear microstructural analysis  Mark P. Taylor 
 
  9  2006  Capital, labour and productivity: What role do  Antonio Bassanetti 
      they play in the potential GDP weakness of  Jörg Döpke, Roberto Torrini 




 10  2006  Real-time macroeconomic data and ex ante  J. Döpke, D. Hartmann 
      predictability of stock returns  C. Pierdzioch 
 11  2006  The role of real wage rigidity and labor market   
      frictions for unemployment and inflation   Kai Christoffel 
     dynamics  Tobias  Linzert 
 
 12  2006  Forecasting the price of crude oil via 
      convenience yield predictions  Thomas A. Knetsch 
 
 13  2006  Foreign direct investment in the enlarged EU: 
      do taxes matter and to what extent?  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 14  2006  Inflation and relative price variability in the euro Dieter Nautz 
      area: evidence from a panel threshold model  Juliane Scharff 
 
 15  2006  Internalization and internationalization 
      under competing real options  Jan Hendrik Fisch 
 
 16  2006  Consumer price adjustment under the 
      microscope: Germany in a period of low  Johannes Hoffmann 
     inflation  Jeong-Ryeol  Kurz-Kim 
 
 17  2006  Identifying the role of labor markets  Kai Christoffel 
      for monetary policy in an estimated  Keith Küster 
     DSGE  model  Tobias  Linzert 
 
 18  2006  Do monetary indicators (still) predict 
      euro area inflation? Boris  Hofmann 
 
 19  2006  Fool the markets? Creative accounting,  Kerstin Bernoth 
      fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 20  2006  How would formula apportionment in the EU 
      affect the distribution and the size of the   Clemens Fuest 
      corporate tax base? An analysis based on   Thomas Hemmelgarn 




 21  2006  Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New 
      Keynesian model with capital accumulation  Campbell Leith 
      and non-Ricardian consumers  Leopold von Thadden 
 
 22  2006  Real-time forecasting and political stock market  Martin Bohl, Jörg Döpke 
      anomalies: evidence for the U.S.  Christian Pierdzioch 
 
 23  2006  A reappraisal of the evidence on PPP:  
      a systematic investigation into MA roots   Christoph Fischer 
      in panel unit root tests and their implications  Daniel Porath 
 
 24  2006  Margins of multinational labor substitution  Sascha O. Becker 
       Marc-Andreas  Mündler 
 
 25  2006  Forecasting with panel data  Badi H. Baltagi 
 
 26  2006  Do actions speak louder than words?  Atsushi Inoue 
     Household  expectations  of inflation based  Lutz Kilian 
      on micro consumption data  Fatma Burcu Kiraz 
 
 27  2006  Learning, structural instability and present  H. Pesaran, D. Pettenuzzo 
     value  calculations  A.  Timmermann 
 
 28  2006  Empirical Bayesian density forecasting in   Kurt F. Lewis 
      Iowa and shrinkage for the Monte Carlo era  Charles H. Whiteman 
 
 29  2006  The within-distribution business cycle dynamics  Jörg Döpke  
      of German firms  Sebastian Weber 
 
 30  2006  Dependence on external finance: an inherent  George M. von Furstenberg 
      industry characteristic?  Ulf von Kalckreuth 
 
 31  2006  Comovements and heterogeneity in the  
      euro area analyzed in a non-stationary  





 32  2006  Forecasting using a large number of predictors:  Christine De Mol 
      is Bayesian regression a valid alternative to  Domenico Giannone 
     principal  components?  Lucrezia  Reichlin 
 
 33  2006  Real-time forecasting of GDP based on  
      a large factor model with monthly and   Christian Schumacher 
     quarterly  data  Jörg  Breitung 
 
 34  2006  Macroeconomic fluctuations and bank lending:  S. Eickmeier 
      evidence for Germany and the euro area  B. Hofmann, A. Worms 
 
 35  2006  Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and  Mark Hallerberg 
      sovereign risk premia  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 36  2006  Political risk and export promotion:  C. Moser 
      evidence from Germany T.  Nestmann,  M.  Wedow 
 
 37  2006  Has the export pricing behaviour of German 
      enterprises changed? Empirical evidence 
     from  German  sectoral  export prices  Kerstin Stahn 
 
 38  2006  How to treat benchmark revisions? 
      The case of German production and  Thomas A. Knetsch 
      orders statistics  Hans-Eggert Reimers 
 
 39  2006  How strong is the impact of exports and 
      other demand components on German 
      import demand? Evidence from euro-area 
      and non-euro-area imports  Claudia Stirböck 
 
 40  2006  Does trade openness increase  C. M. Buch, J. Döpke 
      firm-level volatility?  H. Strotmann 
 
 41  2006  The macroeconomic effects of exogenous  Kirsten H. Heppke-Falk 
      fiscal policy shocks in Germany:  Jörn Tenhofen 




 42  2006  How good are dynamic factor models 
      at forecasting output and inflation?  Sandra Eickmeier 
      A meta-analytic approach  Christina Ziegler 
 
 43  2006  Regionalwährungen in Deutschland –  
     Lokale  Konkurrenz  für den Euro?  Gerhard Rösl 
 
 44  2006  Precautionary saving and income uncertainty 
      in Germany – new evidence from microdata  Nikolaus Bartzsch 
 
 45  2006  The role of technology in M&As: a firm-level  Rainer Frey 
      comparison of cross-border and domestic deals  Katrin Hussinger 
 
 46  2006  Price adjustment in German manufacturing: 
      evidence from two merged surveys  Harald Stahl 
 
 47  2006  A new mixed multiplicative-additive model 
      for seasonal adjustment  Stephanus Arz 
 
 48  2006  Industries and the bank lending effects of  Ivo J.M. Arnold 
      bank credit demand and monetary policy  Clemens J.M. Kool 
      in Germany  Katharina Raabe 
 
 01  2007  The effect of FDI on job separation  Sascha O. Becker 
       Marc-Andreas  Mündler 
 
 02  2007  Threshold dynamics of short-term interest rates:   
      empirical evidence and implications for the  Theofanis Archontakis 
      term structure  Wolfgang Lemke 
 
 03  2007  Price setting in the euro area:   Dias, Dossche, Gautier 
      some stylised facts from individual  Hernando, Sabbatini 
      producer price data  Stahl, Vermeulen 
 
 04  2007  Unemployment and employment protection 




 05  2007  End-user order flow and exchange rate dynamics  S. Reitz, M. A. Schmidt 
       M.  P.  Taylor 
 
 06  2007  Money-based interest rate rules:  C. Gerberding 
      lessons from German data  F. Seitz, A. Worms 
 
 07  2007  Moral hazard and bail-out in fiscal federations:  Kirsten H. Heppke-Falk 
      evidence for the German Länder  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 08  2007  An assessment of the trends in international 
      price competitiveness among EMU countries  Christoph Fischer 
 
 09  2007  Reconsidering the role of monetary indicators 
      for euro area inflation from a Bayesian  Michael Scharnagl 
      perspective using group inclusion probabilities  Christian Schumacher 
 
 10  2007  A note on the coefficient of determination in  Jeong-Ryeol Kurz-Kim 
      regression models with infinite-variance variables Mico Loretan 
 
 11  2007  Exchange rate dynamics in a target zone -  Christian Bauer 
      a heterogeneous expectations approach  Paul De Grauwe, Stefan Reitz 
 
 12  2007  Money and housing -  Claus Greiber 
      evidence for the euro area and the US  Ralph Setzer 
 
 13  2007  An affine macro-finance term structure model 
      for the euro area  Wolfgang Lemke 
 
 14  2007  Does anticipation of government spending matter?  Jörn Tenhofen 
      Evidence from an expectation augmented VAR  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 15  2007  On-the-job search and the cyclical dynamics  Michael Krause 
      of the labor market  Thomas Lubik 
 
 16  2007  Heterogeneous expectations, learning and 




 17  2007  Does intra-firm bargaining matter for  Michael Krause 
      business cycle dynamics?  Thomas Lubik  
 
31
Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 
 
 01  2006  Forecasting stock market volatility with  J. Döpke, D. Hartmann 
      macroeconomic variables in real time  C. Pierdzioch 
 
 02  2006  Finance and growth in a bank-based economy:  Michael Koetter   
      is it quantity or quality that matters?  Michael Wedow 
 
 03  2006  Measuring business sector concentration 
      by an infection model    Klaus Düllmann 
 
 04  2006  Heterogeneity in lending and sectoral  Claudia M. Buch 
      growth: evidence from German  Andrea Schertler 
      bank-level data    Natalja von Westernhagen 
 
 05  2006  Does diversification improve the performance  Evelyn Hayden 
      of German banks? Evidence from individual  Daniel Porath 
      bank loan portfolios    Natalja von Westernhagen 
 
 06  2006  Banks’ regulatory buffers, liquidity networks  Christian Merkl 
      and monetary policy transmission  Stéphanie Stolz 
 
 07  2006  Empirical risk analysis of pension insurance –  W. Gerke, F. Mager 
      the case of Germany    T. Reinschmidt 
           C.  Schmieder 
 
 08  2006  The stability of efficiency rankings when 
      risk-preferences and objectives are different  Michael Koetter 
 
 09  2006  Sector concentration in loan portfolios  Klaus Düllmann 
      and economic capital    Nancy Masschelein 
 
 10  2006  The cost efficiency of German banks:  E. Fiorentino 
      a comparison of SFA and DEA  A. Karmann, M. Koetter 
 





 12  2006  Money market derivatives and the allocation  Falko Fecht 
      of liquidity risk in the banking sector  Hendrik Hakenes 
 
 01  2007  Granularity adjustment for Basel II  Michael B. Gordy 
         Eva  Lütkebohmert 
 
 02  2007  Efficient, profitable and safe banking: 
      an oxymoron? Evidence from a panel  Michael Koetter 
      VAR approach    Daniel Porath 
 
 03  2007  Slippery slopes of stress: ordered failure  Thomas Kick 
      events in German banking    Michael Koetter 
 
 04  2007  Open-end real estate funds in Germany –  C. E. Bannier 
     genesis  and  crisis    F. Fecht, M. Tyrell 
 
 05  2007  Diversification and the banks’ 
      risk-return-characteristics – evidence from  A. Behr, A. Kamp 
      loan portfolios of German banks  C. Memmel, A. Pfingsten 
 
 06  2007  How do banks adjust their capital ratios?  Christoph Memmel 
      Evidence from Germany    Peter Raupach 
 
 07  2007  Modelling dynamic portfolio risk using  Rafael Schmidt 
      risk drivers of elliptical processes  Christian Schmieder 
 
 08  2007  Time-varying contributions by the corporate bond 
      and CDS markets to credit risk price discovery  Niko Dötz 
 
 09  2007  Banking consolidation and small business  K. Marsch, C. Schmieder 
      finance – empirical evidence for Germany  K. Forster-van Aerssen  
33
Visiting researcher at the Deutsche Bundesbank 
 
 
The Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt is looking for a visiting researcher. Among others 
under certain conditions visiting researchers have access to a wide range of data in the 
Bundesbank. They include micro data on firms and banks not available in the public. 
Visitors should prepare a research project during their stay at the Bundesbank. Candidates 
must hold a Ph D and be engaged in the field of either macroeconomics and monetary 
economics, financial markets or international economics. Proposed research projects 
should be from these fields. The visiting term will be from 3 to 6 months. Salary is 
commensurate with experience. 
 
Applicants are requested to send a CV, copies of recent papers, letters of reference and a 
proposal for a research project to: 
 
 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Personalabteilung 
Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14 
 
60431 Frankfurt 
GERMANY 
 